A Bluetooth-class lock in this catalog uses a Bluetooth Low Energy radio to pair to a phone or to a paired gateway — and the right question for a B2B buyer

Yayınlandı: Tem 15, 2025

Smart Lock Bluetooth Security

Smart Lock Bluetooth Security

A Bluetooth-class lock in this catalog uses a Bluetooth Low Energy radio to pair to a phone or to a paired gateway — and the right question for a B2B buyer is not "is Bluetooth secure?" but "which pairing model, which link-layer, which app-side hardening, and which relay-attack ceiling does this SKU ship with?" This article walks a system integrator, importer, or property-security buyer through the four attack surfaces that any Bluetooth-class lock inherits by construction (pairing, replay, relay, eavesdropping), honestly frames the residual risk after the BLE-specific countermeasures are applied, and writes a 14-question RFQ checklist the buyer can paste into the next qualification call. No per-model Bluetooth capability is asserted for any catalog model — for every claim that follows, the answer is "check the model’s published specification" until the SKU has been shortlisted and the supplier has documented it in writing.

Cluster position and sibling routing. This article sits in C09 (Security / Testing) alongside Smart Lock Security Architecture, which names the seven-layer threat model a connected lock inherits; Smart Lock PIN Security and Smart Lock RFID Security which dissect the credential layers that sit behind whatever the Bluetooth radio does; Smart Lock Credential Security which lays the credential storage baseline that the BLE radio relies on; and the C09 radio-clause counterpart article Smart Lock WiFi Security which dissects the 2.4 / 5 GHz radio-class threat model. Where 446 (Smart Lock Bluetooth vs WiFi for B2B) scores the two radio classes cell by cell, this article opens the Bluetooth cell and walks through it. Read those two together before writing the connectivity clause on a procurement spec.

Catalog position. Across the 79-model factory range, the supported connectivity platform lanes are TTLock, Tuya, Doodle, and hotel PC software — check the model’s published specification for each shortlisted SKU. Bluetooth capability is confirmed at the catalog-class level for the classes that pair with TTLock / Tuya apps; Wi-Fi capability is not asserted for any specific catalog model — check the model’s published specification whether Wi-Fi is offered. Matter / Zigbee / Apple Home Key / UWB / Thread / Z-Wave are not in the catalog. Every Bluetooth-class spec claim in this article is a question to ask, not a feature to assume.

1. The four attack surfaces every Bluetooth-class lock inherits

Every Bluetooth-class lock — whatever the model, whatever the credential set — inherits four attack surfaces by construction. The first three (pairing, replay, eavesdropping) have been in the public security literature for more than fifteen years. The fourth (relay) is the modern concern that has driven most of the link-layer hardware changes a buyer will see documented in the supplier's spec sheet. The honest framing for a B2B buyer is that none of the four is a defect — each is a property of the radio class — and each can be reduced, but none can be eliminated by the lock alone.

Attack surfaceWhat the attacker doesWhere the risk livesCountermeasure anchor
Pairing interception / MITMSits between phone and lock during initial pairing; impersonates the lock to the phone or the phone to the lockInitial pair window only (not per-unlock); user-channel dependencyLE Secure Connections with numeric comparison (Bluetooth 4.2+); passkey entry; out-of-band channel
ReplayCaptures a valid unlock command and retransmits it later, possibly from the same personLock's tolerance for re-transmitted frames; per-credential nonceNonce-protected unlock frames; rolling counters; per-use one-time tokens
RelayTwo attackers stretch the radio range — one near the phone, one near the lock — so the lock thinks the phone is in rangeLock's distance-bounding hardware; pairing model's tolerance for round-trip latencyDistance-bounding primitives; challenge–response with cryptographic timing; gateway-mediated attestation
EavesdroppingCaptures BLE traffic passively (sniffer dongle, SDR) and tries to extract credentials or session keysPairing mode (pre-LE-SC legacy pairing); session key strengthLE Secure Connections (P-256 ECDH); never legacy PIN pairing; lock-side session timeout
(Adjacent) Privacy trackingTracks the lock by its BLE MAC address across physical locationsDevice-address privacy featureMAC randomization (BLE privacy feature, supported from Bluetooth 4.0 onward); re-bind on identification

Two design notes worth flagging up front. First, replay and relay are not the same attack — replay captures a valid frame, relay does not, which is why the countermeasures look different. Second, all four attack surfaces disappear entirely if the lock is sold and operated in BLE-offline mode (PIN, card, fingerprint, mechanical key only). This is itself a legitimate procurement lever; it is the same lever hotel RFID-only deployments already use.

2. The pairing-model decision — legacy PIN, Just Works, passkey, numeric comparison

The single biggest factor in pairing-attack resistance is which pairing model the firmware uses. Legacy Bluetooth (pre-4.2) PIN pairing is the historical weak point — the PIN is typically a 6-digit code printed on a sticker or set at the factory; the leak channel is the physical label, not the protocol. Modern LE Secure Connections replace that PIN with a P-256 elliptic-curve Diffie–Hellman exchange, and the human-comparison step is what binds the two devices to each other.

Pairing modelBLE generation floorMITM resistanceOperator UXBuyer question
Legacy PIN pairingBluetooth 2.1–4.1Weak (PIN on sticker)One-time entryHas this SKU moved off legacy PIN pairing? Check the model’s published specification.
Just Works (no display)Bluetooth 4.0+None against active MITMTap-to-pair; no user UIWhat device-class UI does the lock expose for pairing confirmation?
Passkey EntryBluetooth 4.2+ (LE SC)Strong (6-digit passkey entered on both sides)User enters a 6-digit passkeyDoes the lock display a passkey during initial pair?
Numeric ComparisonBluetooth 4.2+ (LE SC)Strong (Yes/No on both sides, with display)Display Yes/No, user confirmsDoes the lock expose a Numeric Comparison UX (display + button)?
Out-of-Band (NFC / QR)Bluetooth 4.2+ (LE SC)Strong (external channel binds the pair)Tap NFC or scan QRIs an OOB channel supported as an alternative pair method?

The honest framing for a B2B spec writer is that legacy PIN pairing is not acceptable on a 2025-vintage procurement spec for any installed door — but the only honest way to write that line is per-SKU verification. A factory that ships models on multiple BLE generations will list the older-class models as "BLE 4.0" or "BLE 4.1"; the LESC-capable models will list "BLE 5.0" or "BLE 5.3." Those three numbers in the supplier's spec sheet are the fastest way to bound the MITM ceiling before the buyer invests in a sample test.

3. Replay attacks and what stops them

A replay attack captures a valid unlock command over the air and replays it later, possibly from the same authorized user. The lock is not being impersonated, the unlock command is, and the lock's job is to reject any frame it has already seen.

The countermeasures are well-known and reduce to four primitives that a competent firmware team wires together:

  1. Nonce per unlock frame. Every unlock command carries a one-time number. The lock rejects any nonce it has seen in the last N frames (typically a rolling window bounded by battery budget — check the model’s published specification what N is).
  2. Rolling counter / sequence number. A monotonic counter tied to the credential and the lock's internal clock. The lock rejects any counter value lower than the last accepted one on that credential.
  3. Time-bounded one-time token. The phone or app generates a token that is valid for a window of seconds (commonly 5–30 s), tied to wall-clock time. Replay outside the window is rejected.
  4. Session-key rotation per BLE connection. Every fresh BLE session negotiates a new short-lived key. A captured frame from a previous session fails decryption on a new session.
CountermeasureDefends againstHas costBuyer-verifiable?
Per-frame nonceReplay of identical frameLock-side storage (FIFO buffer)Ask the supplier for the nonce width and the rolling-window size — check the model’s published specification
Rolling sequence counterReplay with mutated payloadLock firmware burdenAsk for the counter increment rule and persistence across power-loss — check the model’s published specification
Time-bounded one-time tokenLong-window replayClock-skew tolerance on the lockAsk whether the lock has a hardware RTC and how clock-skew is handled — check the model’s published specification
Session-key rotation per BLE connectionSession-hijack replayNegotiation latency on each unlockAsk whether the firmware rotates the LTK per session — check the model’s published specification

For a B2B reader the practical guidance is that one countermeasure is not sufficient — the strongest published implementations stack all four. The buyer-side RFQ line should name the stack, not the primitive: "Replay resistance per published stack: nonce + rolling counter + time-bounded token + per-session LTK rotation — check the model’s published specification."

4. Relay attacks and what stops them

A relay attack is the modern concern a serious B2B buyer will name in the security review. The attack has two participants — an "evil phone" near the authorized user and an "evil lock" near the door — and stretches the radio path so the lock believes the phone is in range when it is in fact several walls away (or in another city). The attack is not theoretical; published academic demonstrations and one now-famous Tesla-style relay demo for car passive-entry systems have made it the de-facto counter-example every spec writer should expect a security team to mention.

The defining characteristic of a relay attack is that the captured frame is fresh — it was just generated by the legitimate user — which is why replay-style countermeasures (nonce, counter) do not catch it. The countermeasures that do catch it all reduce to one of three families:

FamilyPrincipleCostBuyer question
Distance bounding (radio layer)The lock sends a challenge; the phone must respond inside a tight round-trip window (nanosecond budget) — propagation delay is the proxy for distanceAdds a custom physical layer; not all BLE chipsets support it; rare on consumer-grade smart locksDoes the lock support any distance-bounding primitive? Check the model’s published specification — do not assume.
Cryptographic challenge–response (protocol layer)The lock issues a cryptographic challenge the phone must solve; the phone's processing time bounds the attacker's latency budgetIncreases unlock latency; needs a phone-side coprocessor or app computation budgetDoes pairing use a challenge–response on every BLE session, with documented latency tolerance? — check the model’s published specification
Gateway-mediated attestation (architecture layer)The lock talks only to a paired gateway within the building, not to a phone over the open BLE radioRequires the gateway; changes the deployment modelIs the lock deployed with a paired gateway that mediates every unlock? — check the model’s published specification

The honest one-line summary: in 2025 a B2B buyer should assume any consumer-grade BLE smart lock is relay-vulnerable — because the radio chip on the lock side almost certainly does not implement a distance-bounding primitive. The available mitigations are the gateway-mediated pattern, an additional-factor challenge at the app layer (PIN before BLE unlock), or geographic/physical co-presence enforced by building design. None of those is the lock's radio doing the work alone.

5. Eavesdropping — pairing mode and session-key strength

A passive BLE sniffer (a $20 USB dongle with Wireshark, or a software-defined radio at higher cost) can sit in radio range and record the bytes. Whether the bytes are useful is the question.

For a buyer the relevant facts are:

  • Pairing-mode traffic is the leakiest. If the lock uses legacy PIN pairing, the PIN is exchanged during pair-up, and a passive sniffer that captures the pair exchange can recover credentials. The defense is LE Secure Connections (Bluetooth 4.2+); under LE SC the key material never crosses the air in a recoverable form.
  • Session traffic (post-pair) is encrypted with the link-layer key. A passive sniffer sees encrypted bytes; breaking them requires breaking AES-CCM, which is not a realistic threat at the lock's clock budget. The defense is therefore to never deploy on legacy pairing and to verify in writing that LE SC is the active pairing model — check the model’s published specification.
  • Long-session attacks (capture-and-store-then-decrypt-later) require an offline AES-CCM break. With a 128-bit key this is not in any current threat-model. With the (deprecated) 7-byte legacy encryption key it is — which is the second reason to refuse legacy pairing on a 2025 procurement spec.

The buyer-side one-liner: "Pairing model must be LE Secure Connections or stronger; legacy PIN pairing disqualifies the SKU. Check the model’s published specification that LE SC is the active pairing model."

6. Other published BLE attack classes the buyer should know

Outside the four headline surfaces, a small library of named BLE-specific attacks has accumulated in the published literature. A serious system-integrator buyer should be able to name each one in the security review, even if the published exploit code does not apply to a specific lock. The named attacks a 2025 reviewer is most likely to be asked about, with their applicability to a Bluetooth-class smart lock:

Named attackWhat it exploitsBLE version exposureCurrent lock applicability
BlueBorne (2017)Remote code execution via a stack bug in the BLE chip on the deviceBluetooth stacks on Linux / Android / IoT firmware from c. 2017Applies if the lock's BLE module runs an unpatched stack — check the model’s published specification that the lock's BLE chipset is on a currently-supported firmware branch.
KNOB (Key Negotiation of Bluetooth, 2019)Forces the negotiation of an entropy-weak session key (1-byte key length accepted)Bluetooth BR/EDR and BLE; vendor-specific behaviorApplies if the lock accepts the Bluetooth spec's minimum entropy knob — check the model’s published specification whether entropy is enforced at the spec maximum.
BLESA (Bluetooth Low Energy Spoofing Attack, 2020)Spoofs the peripheral at reconnect and bypasses the legitimate reauthenticationBLE reconnection handshakeApplies if the reconnection handshake is not authenticated — check the model’s published specification whether the reconnection path requires a fresh cryptographic bind.
SweynTooth (2019)Family of protocol bugs across multiple BLE SoCsVendor-specific BLE stacksApplies per-chipset — check the model’s published specification which BLE SoC the SKU uses and whether it is on a vendor advisory list.
BIAS (Bluetooth Impersonation AttackS, 2020)Impersonation of a previously-paired device during re-pairBluetooth BR/EDR; some LE overlapLess relevant on modern LESC-only stacks — check the model’s published specification.

The buyer-side takeaway is not that any one of these named attacks will compromise a given SKU; it is that the field of named BLE attacks has been active continuously since 2017 and the only durable mitigation is firmware updateability. That single phrase — "firmware updateable via OTA, with a documented secure-boot path" — belongs on every Bluetooth-class RFQ line. Check the model’s published specification for every shortlisted SKU.

7. BLE-specific countermeasures — what the engineering answer actually looks like

Stepping back from the attack catalog, the countermeasures a 2025-vintage Bluetooth-class lock can implement fall into three groups: link-layer, firmware-/protocol-layer, and architecture-layer. The buyer-side scoring rubric below weights them not on a marketing checklist but on what each countermeasure actually changes about the residual risk surface.

CountermeasureLayerWhat it changesStrengthAcquisition cost
LE Secure Connections (LESC)LinkReplaces legacy PIN pairing with P-256 ECDH; closes the pairing-eavesdropping windowHigh (modern)Native on Bluetooth 4.2+ chipsets; no extra BOM
128-bit AES-CCM encryption on every linkLinkCloses the post-pair passive-sniffer windowHighNative on Bluetooth 4.0+ chipsets; no extra BOM
Privacy feature (MAC randomization)LinkStops BLE MAC-based physical trackingMediumNative on Bluetooth 4.0+ chipsets
Per-frame nonce + rolling counterFirmware / protocolCloses replay-window at unlockHighFirmware implementation; lock-side FIFO buffer
Time-bounded one-time unlock tokenFirmware / protocolCloses long-window replay; bounds stolen-token reuseMediumFirmware + hardware RTC on lock
Per-session LTK rotationFirmware / protocolCloses session-hijack replayHighFirmware implementation
OTA firmware update with secure bootFirmware / lifecycleLets the lock receive the future patch — including patch-for-named-ble-attackVery HighOEM-side; firmware signing infrastructure; lock-side bootloader
Distance bounding (UWB-style, if offered)LinkCloses the relay-attack ceiling on the radio sideVery HighCustom radio; unusual on consumer-grade smart locks
Gateway-mediated architectureArchitectureReplaces the open BLE radio path; lock talks only to a paired bridgeHighExtra gateway hardware + site-side LAN dependency
Out-of-band channel (QR / NFC for pair)PairingCloses the active-MITM window during initial pairHighQR / NFC + lock-side UI
Two-factor at app layer (PIN before BLE unlock)App / credentialCloses the relay-attack window by adding a human factor the attacker cannot relay without seeing the screenMedium-HighPure firmware; depends on app UX

For a B2B buyer writing the connectivity clause of an RFQ, the practical scoring rubric is:

  • Minimum acceptable on any 2025-vintage door: LESC pairing + 128-bit link encryption + per-frame nonce + OTA firmware path with secure boot. Check the model’s published specification that all four are supported on the SKU you shortlist.
  • Recommended for medium-risk sites (apartments, serviced apartments, small offices): the minimum + privacy feature (MAC randomization) + per-session LTK rotation. Check the model’s published specification.
  • Recommended for higher-risk sites (executive suites, IT rooms, vaults): the recommended stack + distance-bounding hardware if available OR gateway-mediated architecture OR app-layer second factor. Check the model’s published specification which of these three is offered.

For sites that already mandate a paired gateway (multi-property operations, hotels with a centralized management PC) the architecture-layer mitigation is essentially free for the operator — the lock simply does not expose an unauthenticated BLE path to a phone.

8. The app-side and OS-side surface — the half the spec sheet does not cover

The BLE radio is only one of three surfaces the buyer inherits when they buy a Bluetooth-class lock. The other two are the phone-side app and the mobile operating system.

  • Phone-side app hardening. The app that drives the BLE radio is also the credential vault. The honest framing is that a well-engineered BLE lock can be defeated by a poorly-engineered app that stores the unlock token on disk in plaintext, logs BLE traffic in the debug channel, or accepts an unauthenticated deep link from the browser. The buyer-side question: where does the app store the per-device unlock credential (keychain / keystore, or app-private storage)? Check the model’s published specification.
  • Operating-system ble-permission model. iOS and Android both enforce BLE permission at the foreground-only rule (since 2020 in iOS 13, hardened since 2021 in Android 12 with the "never ask again" guardrail). This means a background-app BLE sniff is much harder than it was in 2018, but a foreground-attacker-in-the-middle (an app already running with BLE permission that the user tapped through) is not. The buyer-side question: does the app enforce foreground-only unlock UX, and is there a server-side unlockable-creds console to revoke stolen phones?
  • Supply-chain surface (the BLE chipset and its firmware). The lock-side BLE chipset is most likely a third-party module (a Nordic, a Texas Instruments, a Realtek, or an Airoha). The published BlueBorne, KNOB, BLESA and SweynTooth advisories above all live in vendor-specific BLE stacks, and the patch cadence is set by that vendor, not by the lock manufacturer. The buyer-side question: which BLE chipset is on this SKU and what is the chipset vendor's published firmware-BOM cadence? Check the model’s published specification.

A 2025 Bluetooth-class lock that scores perfectly on the link-layer countermeasures but ships an app with allowBackup=true and stores the per-door token in /data/data/<app>/files/ instead of the Android Keystore is not more secure than a 2018-vintage lock with legacy PIN pairing. Both leak the credential set in different ways.

9. Buyer-side RFQ checklist — paste this into the next qualification call

The following checklist is written for the buyer to copy into the next qualification call as a single block. For each numbered line the appropriate answer is "check the model’s published specification" — there is no honest universal answer at the catalog-class level, only at the SKU level.

#Question to the supplierAcceptable evidence
1Which BLE generation is on the SKU (4.0 / 4.2 / 5.0 / 5.3)?Spec-sheet line; chipset model number
2Is LE Secure Connections (LESC) the active pairing model, or is legacy PIN pairing still selectable in the firmware?Firmware configuration documentation
3Which pairing UX is offered (Just Works / Passkey Entry / Numeric Comparison / Out-of-Band)?App screenshot or user manual
4What is the link-layer encryption key size (always 128-bit AES-CCM on modern BLE)?Spec-sheet line
5Does every unlock frame carry a nonce and a rolling counter? What is the rolling-window size (in frames or in seconds)?Firmware design note
6Is the session LTK rotated per BLE connection?Firmware design note
7What is the time-bounded token validity window for app-initiated unlock (seconds)?Spec-sheet line; firmware design note
8Does the firmware enforce a minimum reconnection-bind, or does it accept any previously-paired device on simple reconnect?Firmware design note
9Is distance-bounding hardware on the lock side, and if so, which chipset provides it?Hardware BOM line
10Is MAC randomization (privacy feature) on by default in production firmware?Spec-sheet line; configuration documentation
11What is the OTA firmware-update cadence and the secure-boot path (signed firmware, rollback protection)?Firmware lifecycle document
12Where does the phone-side app store per-device unlock credentials (Android Keystore / iOS Keychain / app-private storage)?App security assessment or vendor self-disclosure
13Does the lock support a paired-gateway architecture for remote unlock; if so, is remote unlock mediated end-to-end via the gateway rather than direct BLE?Architecture diagram from the supplier
14Is the chipset vendor's published firmware-BOM cadence documented and within active vendor support?Vendor advisory page URL or chipset datasheet

This is a 14-line question set. A buyer who can answer "yes, documented in writing for this SKU" on at least lines 1, 2, 5, 7, 9, 11 and 13 is well-equipped to write the connectivity clause of the procurement spec with confidence. Items 3, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12 and 14 are the second tier; a "yes" on those is the difference between an acceptable deployment and an excellent one.

10. Illustrative scenario — a 220-key mixed-use property writing the connectivity clause

Consider a 220-key mixed-use property (180 short-stay rooms + 40 long-stay serviced apartments, plus a co-working ground floor) where the operator is replacing a legacy magstripe hotel system. The procurement team has shortlisted three Bluetooth-class candidate locks (A, B, C — vendor identities not asserted here) and is using this article's checklist as the qualification loop.

  • Lock A returns a complete spec sheet: BLE 5.0, LESC only, per-frame nonce + rolling counter + per-session LTK rotation, app uses Android Keystore / iOS Keychain, OTA signed firmware with rollback protection, paired-gateway architecture supported. The only red flag is that the BLE chipset is on a vendor advisory list — the operator records a follow-up: "confirm chipset vendor advisory status before order." Cost-side and RFQ-side assessment: this lock fits the cluster-C09 checklist and can carry the connectivity clause as written.
  • Lock B returns a spec sheet that lists BLE 4.2 and supports both LESC and legacy PIN pairing in firmware. The supplier explains that legacy PIN pairing remains selectable for a "legacy phone" compatibility mode. The operator's security team downgrades the SKU from "acceptable" to "qualify only if the legacy path can be firmware-disabled by policy" — and records this in the RFQ notes. This is a neutral outcome, not a disqualification.
  • Lock C returns a spec sheet that lists BLE 4.0 — pre-LESC. The operator's security team disqualifies the SKU for the hotel-room doors (where credentials are short-lived and rotation matters) but allows it on the long-stay apartment doors under a closed-network deployment (no public app, credentials provisioned by building staff only). The SKU is downgraded, not eliminated — the cluster-C09 framing supports this kind of split decision because it is per door, not per property.

The three cases show the same checklist yielding three different reasonable answers because the underlying radio classes differ. There is no single "Bluetooth secure / not secure" verdict — there is a per-SKU compliance check against the 14-question list. Note that all three judgments above are construction examples for illustration only; no model is asserted to be the supplier's actual offering, and per-SKU confirmation on the product page remains the only honest answer.

11. Cross-cluster routing — what to read next

Bluetooth is one of three radio classes this catalog ships (alongside Wi-Fi on models that confirm it and the offline-only classes that ship no radio at all). For a buyer who has finished with the Bluetooth clause, the next three reads are:

  • Smart Lock WiFi Security — the radio-class counterpart article. If the buyer's connectivity plan is dual-radio (BLE for the door and Wi-Fi somewhere in the path), this article is the next 20 minutes.
  • Smart Lock Bluetooth vs WiFi for B2B — the comparison datasheet that scores the two radio classes cell by cell. Useful when the buyer has to write a connectivity clause that pits the two radios against each other.
  • Smart Lock Security Architecture — the seven-layer threat-model article that frames the BLE layer as one of seven a connected lock inherits. Useful when the buyer is writing a top-level security review that needs the BLE layer contextualized.

For buyers whose deployment is in hospitality, the cluster-C03 hotel-lock cluster has separate coverage of the offline-RFID path that an "all-mobile-key" architecture sometimes replaces; for buyers whose deployment includes a site-side gateway, the cluster-C07 articles on cloud-vs-local and gateway-vs-direct-WiFi pin down the architecture context the BLE radio inherits.

12. What the supplier will and will not put in writing

A practical note on procurement reality: the Bluetooth-class capability list on the product page is what the supplier stands behind; what is not on the product page is not warranted. The honest framing for a B2B buyer is that the supplier can document everything in Section 9 in writing — chipset model, BLE generation, pairing model, OTC firmware path, app-side credential storage, paired-gateway support — because every one of these is something the supplier has either chosen or constrained. What the supplier cannot honestly put in writing is "this lock has no relay vulnerability" — because that is not a per-SKU property in 2025; it is a property of the radio class. Section 4 above is the longest because the relay-attack ceiling is the difference between a marketing-class "Bluetooth secure" claim and a procurement-grade assurance. Buy accordingly.

13. Twelve-question procurement clause the buyer can copy

Finally — for the B2B reader who needs a paste-and-edit clause for the next RFQ — the procurement spec below is what this article would write if it were a one-page attachment. Every clause references the 14-question checklist in Section 9 and the countermeasure scoring in Section 7; every "shall" line names per-SKU documentation as the evidence trail.

Connectivity clause (BLE-class). The lock shall support Bluetooth Low Energy on a currently-supported chipset vendor firmware branch. The lock shall implement LE Secure Connections (LESC) as the active pairing model; legacy PIN pairing shall be firmware-disabled. The lock shall encrypt all link-layer traffic using 128-bit AES-CCM. Every unlock frame shall carry a per-credential nonce and a rolling sequence counter. The session LTK shall be rotated per BLE connection. The lock shall enforce a time-bounded one-time-token window for app-initiated unlock (window size: per-SKU documented; acceptable floor 5 s, recommended floor 30 s). The lock shall support OTA firmware updates with signed firmware images and rollback protection; firmware images shall be retained across power-loss for at least the rolling 90-day window. Where app-side credential storage is in use, the app shall use the Android Keystore or iOS Keychain as the credential vault; no plaintext credential shall be written to /data/data/<app>/. The lock may support a paired-gateway architecture for remote unlock; where supported, remote unlock shall be mediated end-to-end via the gateway rather than via direct BLE from outside radio range. The supplier shall document, in writing for each shortlisted SKU, the answers to questions 1–14 in the buyer checklist attached to this clause. Wi-Fi capability and any out-of-catalog radio (Matter, Zigbee, Apple Home Key, UWB, Thread, Z-Wave) shall not be asserted for any SKU not confirmed on the relevant product page. Prices, MOQ, lead time, warranty years and certifications are out of scope for this clause and shall be addressed separately.

That clause is a usable starting point. The buyer should expect to extend it (or trim it) for site-specific requirements — ingress protection class for outdoor doors, fire-rating for stairwell doors, audit-push cadence into a PMS, etc. — but the BLE-countermeasure spine is reusable across residential, hospitality, and commercial procurement specs.

Closing

Bluetooth-class locks in this catalog sit on a three-tier countermeasure stack: minimum (LESC + 128-bit + per-frame nonce + OTA), recommended (the minimum + privacy + per-session LTK rotation), higher-risk (the recommended + distance-bounding or gateway-mediated or app-layer second factor). The pairing-model decision rules the pairing-attack ceiling; the nonce + counter + time-token stack rules the replay-attack ceiling; the architecture decision (gateway vs direct BLE) rules the relay-attack ceiling. Every per-SKU number in this stack is "check the model’s published specification" until the supplier has documented it in writing. The 14-question checklist in Section 9 is the procurement-grade test; the paste-and-edit clause in Section 13 is the template.

For the next step on the buyer's path, the request a quote page is the right place to send the shortlisted SKUs and the 14-line question set for written responses per SKU, and the order samples page starts the lab-side validation that confirms the link-layer assertions on the bench. Buyers whose deployment is on the cluster-C03 hotel RFID path should also review the hotel-lock category page for the offline credential set that a Bluetooth-class SKU in the hotel cluster typically pairs with — check the model’s published specification whether the shortlisted hotel-class model supports the offline-card provision alongside the BLE radio.

Sepetiniz
Bu siteyi kullanırkenizin deneyimini çerezlere izin vererek iyileştirebilirsiniz. Çerez Politikası
Chat on WhatsApp