What changes when the same motor-not-driving fault must be handled across several sites: who travels, what a desk can close, and what the record teaches.

Yayınlandı: Kas 12, 2024

Multi-site Motor Not Driving: What Changes at Scale

Multi-site Motor Not Driving: What Changes at Scale

A single door whose motor will not move is a short job. The same fault across twelve doors in four towns is a different piece of work entirely: the fault tree is identical, but almost everything around it moves — who is allowed to travel, what a desk can close before anybody leaves a building, which facts have to stay local because only a local body can see them, and how the record from one site becomes the evidence that saves a trip at the next. That is the whole subject of motor not driving multi site work: the same eight checks, run by different bodies, on different days, in buildings that do not behave alike.

Direct answer. A motor not driving multi site programme is decided in five places — the desk that reads the unit's state, the floor that can turn a handle by hand, the van that carries the spares, the supplier who authorises a return, and the ledger that remembers what happened. The tree never changes; the routing does. Get the routing wrong and every site pays for a technician to re-discover what a desk could have closed, and the second site pays again because nobody wrote down what the first site learned. Get it right and the estate's fault history becomes a diagnostic instrument instead of an invoice.

  • Choose the schedule — define how often motor not driving multi site is inspected
  • Choose the cutoff — name the condition that forces a change to motor-not-driving
  • Report the reading — keep one metric that shows round one is healthy
  • For motor not driving multi site, the order below is fixed and motor not driving is the reference point.

This comparison runs four operating models through eight rounds and then scores them against your own constraints. The four contenders are: site-local hands only, with the supplier reached by phone; a regional technician who travels between sites carrying spares; a central triage desk that works the queue from the office; and the hybrid most portfolios end up with by accident, where a desk, a floor and a van each hold a slightly different version of the truth.

The referee is fixed: eight checks in a fixed order, each with a stated reason for moving on, ending in a unit replacement and a record of what was replaced, what was observed and what was tested. That is a method rather than a warranty of diagnosis — what your own technician should be able to run, and what a supplier's written support should ask for before it authorises a return.

At one site, one person runs the whole tree. At portfolio scale the tree is still eight checks, but the bodies available to run it multiply, and the discipline that keeps it honest becomes a routing problem: which body may run which check, and what must the desk already be holding before a van is sent.

The Referee: One Tree, Executed by Three Different Bodies

The order of the checks is not arbitrary. The tree runs cheapest-first: a door that is trying to re-latch against a mis-aligned or pre-loaded leaf is not a motor fault at all, and no amount of bench diagnosis will find that. A handle that turns by hand rules out a seized gearbox and moves the suspicion into the drive, the power and the electronics. A low-battery reading, a jam indication and no response at all are three different faults with three different routes, which is why the third check splits the tree rather than narrowing it.

The fourth check is where most single-site arguments end and where multi-site operations begin. Power is established by testing the cells or the pack, and by testing the terminal or USB emergency input if the model has one. A low-battery alert is a threshold, not a measurement, so it cannot close the question: a cell that reads above the threshold can still fail the moment the motor draws current. Whether your SKU offers an emergency power input is a per-model question, so confirm on the dated product page for the specific SKU before you write it into a site instruction. The hardware behind this is in the smart door locks.

What changes at scale is not the sequence but the number of hands. The same eight checks can be run by three different bodies, and the useful discipline is to name the tier for each one: the desk, which reads what the unit says; the floor, which stands at the door; and the van, which carries the tools and the spares.

flowchart TD
    A["Fault reported by site staff"] --> B["Desk reads the unit state and the recent events"]
    B --> C{"What the unit reports"}
    C -->|"A state mismatch"| D["Configuration and sync review at the desk"]
    C -->|"A threshold only"| E["Cell and pack test at the door"]
    C -->|"No reading at all"| F["Floor check of handle and latch"]
    D --> G{"Door state agrees now"}
    E --> H{"Power holds under load"}
    F --> I{"Handle turns by hand"}
    G --> J["Compare the fingerprint across doors of the same model"]
    H --> J
    I --> J
    J --> K{"Same fingerprint on two doors"}
    K -->|"Yes"| L["Hold replacements and open a configuration or batch review"]
    K -->|"No"| M["Swap the unit and write the full record"]
    L --> N["Supplier support review with the record attached"]
    M --> N

One consequence of scale is worth stating early. The seventh check — is the fingerprint of this fault the same on two doors of the same model — is the step that separates a repair from a mass replacement, and it is the only step that a single site cannot perform alone. At portfolio scale you can enter at step seven, because you already hold comparable doors; at one site, step seven is something you hope to reach.

Round One: Who Actually Travels, and With What

Four models enter this round, and they differ less in competence than in coverage.

ModelWho travelsWhat they carryDecides aloneBlind spotBreaks when
A. Site-local handsNobody; the site actsA phone, a spare cell set, the local recordSteps one to four at the doorThe credential path and the model's own behaviourNo trained person on site, or the fault sits beyond step four
B. Regional technicianA technician between sitesA van, a spare pool, the methodAll eight stepsThe estate-wide pattern; one door at a timeSites are too far apart for one body, or the fault lives at step seven
C. Central triage deskA technician only when the desk asksA queue, the unit state, the event log, a dossierSteps three, five, six and sevenEverything physicalThe dispatch chain has no owner, or the door stays down while the desk deliberates
D. Desk, floor and vanThe van, but only for what the desk and the floor cannot closeOne record schema, three handsEverything, in sequenceNothing, if the records are sharedRole ambiguity, and three versions of the same fault

Model A is the cheapest and the most fragile. It works when every site has someone whose competence you have verified against this specific model, and when the fault is the common kind that a careful person with a screwdriver can close at the door. It fails quietly when one site has no such person, because the request then arrives at a supplier support line as a description rather than as a record, and the round trip is paid in somebody's time rather than in your budget.

Model B is the traditional answer and it still earns its place in a wide estate where the same skill must be applied at several sites and the travel itself carries the tools. Its weakness is structural: a technician who visits one site at a time sees one fault at a time. If the same model starts failing at three sites, the travelling technician will replace three units and never notice the pattern, because nobody is holding the other two doors' records.

Model C moves the judgement to the desk and is the only model that can perform step seven as a routine. Its dependency is dispatch: a desk that can close a fault but cannot send a body to close a fault that will not close remotely is a desk that leaves doors down. Model C also concentrates knowledge in one place, which makes the desk a single point of failure unless its records are written in a form a site can pick up and continue.

Model D is where most estates land, and it works only if the three bodies share one schema. Its characteristic failure is administrative rather than technical: the desk reads the fault as a configuration issue, the floor as a unit fault, the van as already closed, and the estate keeps three incompatible versions of one event. The record schema is what prevents that.

Round Two: The Checks a Desk Can Close From Its Chair

Remote fault triage before dispatch is the single largest lever in a multi-site programme, because a closed-at-the-desk fault costs no travel and no vehicle. The question is which checks can honestly close remotely, and the honest answer is that the desk can close more than most teams attempt, provided it holds the right evidence.

Step in the treeWhat the desk can obtainWhat that rules outWhat it cannot rule outBody still needed
Three: indicator and app readingRecent events and the state the controller believes the door is in, on models whose product record shows a networked platformA jam reported as a jam; a credential never issued to that doorA physically jammed door that raised no event; a model with no recorded connectivityConfirm on the dated product page for the specific SKU
Four: powerA battery reading, where the model reports oneNothing on its own, because a low-battery alert is a threshold and not a measurementA tired cell that still reads above the threshold, or an exhausted packFloor, with the cells out and the emergency input tested where the model has one
Five: state agreementThe recorded state from the management system, plus a photo or a call from the doorA configuration or synchronisation fault, once someone confirms the physical stateThe physical state itself, until a person confirms itFloor, for one question only
Six: credential pathThe credential issue record, the validity window, the revocation listA credential that was never valid for that door or fell outside its windowWhether the reader at the door is actually reading the credentialFloor, for the reader test
Seven: the fingerprintThe fault fingerprint from every other door of the same modelA configuration, firmware or supply-batch pattern, and the instruction to stop replacing unitsNothing alone; it needs at least two comparable doorsDesk, and a register that actually exists
One and twoNothingNothingDoor alignment, closer force, latch preload, a seized gearboxFloor or van

Two rows carry more weight than the rest. Step five converts a travel event into a phone call and a photograph: the desk reads the state the controller holds, the site confirms the physical state, and if the two disagree the fault is a configuration problem before it is a motor problem — the cheapest instrument in the tree, and the one most often skipped because its two halves live in different places and nobody owns the join.

Step six is the second. Many "the motor does not move" reports are not motor reports: the door opens on the mechanical key while the credential does not work, which points at the credential layer rather than the drive. A desk that can read the credential issue record and its validity window closes a share of those before anybody leaves. What it cannot close is the reader test itself, which belongs to the floor.

The limits are worth stating plainly. The desk's reach depends on the model. The desk also needs a lawful basis for reading the events and the credential records it wants, which is a local question about the building owner, the data protection position and the retention rules the estate applies. CONFIRM-WITH-LOCAL-DATA-PROTECTION-REVIEW is the line to carry on that point, and the answer belongs in the operating agreement, not in a footnote.

Round Three: The Checks That Cannot Leave the Building

Steps one, two and four are physical, and the temptation at scale is to let a desk guess at them. They should not be guessed.

Step one asks whether the lock is in a locked or unlocked state and whether the handle is free. A lock re-latching against a mis-aligned or pre-loaded door is not a motor fault; the object that causes it is the door leaf, the strike plate, the strike keeper, the closer and the latch preload. Step two asks whether the handle turns freely by hand; if it does, the lock body is not seized and the fault is in the drive, the power or the electronics. Step four asks whether there is power, which means cells or pack out and tested, and the emergency input tested where the model has one.

The scale lesson here is not that these checks need a technician. They need somebody standing at the door. A trained caretaker can perform steps one, two and four in a couple of minutes, provided the instruction names the three things to do and the three things to report: turn the handle by hand and note whether it moves freely, open the cell compartment and report what the cells read when the lock is asked to drive, and photograph the indicator as it sits. What a caretaker may not do is swap a unit or authorise a return. Every multi-site programme needs that line drawn explicitly, because the moment a caretaker is allowed to swap, the record stops being the source of truth.

The second scale lesson is environmental. The same model in a service corridor and in a hotel corridor does not behave alike: door leaf material, frame rebate, backset, closer force, temperature and humidity all vary, and the product record's door fit and environment fields describe the model, not your building. That is precisely why the local observation layer exists. A central file can hold the model's baseline; only the site can hold the door's facts. If the desk concludes that a fault is not present in the product record, the next question is not about the product, it is about this building.

Round Four: What Stays Central, What Stays on the Door

Centralisation is not a matter of taste at portfolio scale; it is a question of which facts remain true when the person who left the building has forgotten them. Some things are true once and can be held centrally. Some are true only at the door and must be re-observed each time. Some are never true anywhere and must not be assumed by anybody.

Keep at the centreKeep at the doorNever assume, at either end
The method and the order of the eight checksThe door identifier taken from the object scheduleThat a low-battery alert is a measurement
The per-model baseline: model, variant, access methods, connectivity, power, emergency input, from the dated product page for the specific SKUThe physical state of the door against the state the controller recordsThat the same model behaves the same way in two buildings
The record schema, including what each check ruled outLatch preload, closer condition, frame rebate, backset, leaf materialThat a swap proved the cause
The escalation ladder: who may close, dispatch, swap, return and sign offThe credential state before and afterThat the reporting site is representative of the estate
The pool policy for pooled spare lock units, and which variant may be fittedThe environment the door actually sits inThat a returned unit has been diagnosed by anyone
The signature index: the fault fingerprint for every model in the estateWho attended, and what they were authorised to doThat a fault closed at the desk never needed a body

The middle column is short by design. It is the list of things that must be re-observed at the door every single time, and keeping it short is what makes the central record trustworthy. Everything a site can observe cheaply and repeatedly belongs there; everything a site can only observe once, slowly, or not at all belongs at the centre.

The third column is where multi-site programmes lose their integrity. The most common failure in practice is a site reading a low-battery alert, swapping the cells, and recording the fault as a power fault, when the alert was a threshold crossing rather than a measurement of the pack. The second is a unit swapped at three sites in a fortnight and three records that agree on the symptom while disagreeing on everything else, which leaves the estate unable to tell a batch problem from three coincidences.

A register is the physical prerequisite for centralisation. Before a desk can compare fingerprints, close faults remotely or pool spares by variant, it must hold a list of the estate's doors with their model, variant and site. The object schedule produced during a site survey is that list. Where the estate grew by acquisition, the register is the first artefact that has to be rebuilt, because a comparison that spans two estates cannot start from two disconnected spreadsheets.

Round Five: Two Records, Two Audiences

Every procedure in this family ends with a record, and at portfolio scale there are two of them. The site record is per fault, per door, written by the people at the door. The portfolio dossier is the roll-up that the desk holds: fault fingerprints by model and variant, the routes that closed them, the units that were swapped, the patterns that emerged. Both use the same schema, and the dossier is a selection from the site records rather than a separate report.

erDiagram
    SITE ||--o{ DOOR : holds
    DOOR ||--o{ FAULT_RECORD : raises
    FAULT_RECORD ||--o{ CHECK_LOG : records
    FAULT_RECORD ||--o| UNIT_SWAP : closes_with
    FAULT_RECORD }o--|| PORTFOLIO_DOSSIER : indexes
    SITE {
        string site_id
        string environment_class
        string authorised_responder
    }
    DOOR {
        string door_id
        string model_variant
        string object_schedule_ref
    }
    FAULT_RECORD {
        string record_id
        string reported_at
        string operable_at
        string resolved_by_tier
    }
    CHECK_LOG {
        string check_code
        string ruled_out
        string evidence_ref
    }
    UNIT_SWAP {
        string old_unit_id
        string new_unit_id
        string pool_ref
    }
    PORTFOLIO_DOSSIER {
        string signature_index
        string escalation_ref
        string disposition
    }
FieldWritten byWhenWhat it buys you at portfolio scale
Door or unit identifier from the object scheduleWhoever opens the ticketAt reportJoins the fault to the estate register; a room number will not
Model and variant, from the label or the catalogue rowThe site or the technicianAt first sightLets a fingerprint be compared against another door of the same model
Reported time, and the time the door was operable againThe reporting channel, then the closerSame dayThe only two numbers behind any availability measure you compute
Symptom in the technician's words, plus the measured observationWhoever attendedAt the doorSeparates a motor that did not move from a door that did not latch
The checks run, in order, and what each one ruled outWhoever ran themAs they runThe column that turns a list of actions into evidence the next site can inherit
Parts fitted or unit swapped, with the old unit retainedWhoever did itAt closeGives the desk a unit to compare and the supplier something to look at
Credential state before and afterThe desk, then the doorBefore and afterSeparates a credential fault from a drive fault
The photograph or reading that supports the conclusionWhoever holds the evidenceAt closeSurvives the departure of the person who attended
Site identifier and the tier that resolved itThe triage deskAt closeShows which routes actually work across the estate

Two rows carry the weight of the whole scheme. The first is the column that records what each check ruled out: without it the record is a list of actions, and with it the record is evidence, which is what matters the moment a second site reports the same symptom. The second is the pair of timestamps, because they are the raw material of every service measure you compute and the only evidence you hold when someone asks, months later, whether the door was open. Those measures are yours to compute from these fields, with the population and the period stated, and their definitions belong in the agreement so that both sides compute the same number from the same rows. The evidence a motor-not-driving record needs and the documentation set cover the field itself; at estate scale, the addition that matters is the site and tier fields, which turn a pile of tickets into a map of how the estate actually fails.

Round Six: The Signature That Stops the Swap

Step seven is where portfolio scale becomes a diagnostic instrument rather than a travel budget. The check is simple: is the fingerprint of this fault the same on two doors of the same model? If it is, the suspicion moves to configuration, firmware or a supply batch, and the instruction becomes: stop replacing units.

The comparison needs a fixed set of fields, written the same way every time, or the comparison cannot be made. For each fault the estate records the model and variant from the label, the symptom in the attending person's words, the indicator behaviour observed at step three, the result of the power test at step four, whether the override turned at step two, whether the credential path answered at step six, the batch or supply group where it is recorded, the environment class of the site, and the door type with its closer condition. That last field is the one most often missing and the one most often decisive: the same fault on a fire door with a heavy closer and the same fault on a lightweight interior door are not the same finding.

The interpretations follow from how the fields line up. A matching fingerprint on two doors of the same model at different sites points at a shared cause and calls for a configuration, firmware or batch review rather than a further swap. A matching fingerprint on two doors inside one site points at something local, most often the site's own configuration or its environment. Divergent fingerprints on the same model at different sites mean the faults are probably independent, though the units are still worth keeping for comparison. A matching fingerprint on units that also share a batch reference is the case to take to the supplier with the records attached.

Holding a swap is an operational decision with consequences, and it should be written down as one: which units were held, on which date, under which signature, and what was done instead. A withheld swap that is not recorded looks indistinguishable from a slow technician. The record of a withheld swap is also how the estate shows that the decision was deliberate, which matters if the door's operability is later part of a conversation with a building owner or an insurer.

Step seven also reverses the usual order. At one site the tree runs forward, one door at a time. At estate scale you can start at the seventh check by comparing what you already know, and only then work backwards into the earlier steps for the doors that share the fingerprint. That is the point at which the estate's records begin to pay for themselves, and it is why the cross-site comparison belongs to a desk rather than to a travelling technician with one door in front of him.

Round Seven: Spares, Swaps and the Pool That Spans Sites

The spare pool is where the estate's routing decision becomes visible in the van. Pooled spare lock units held centrally minimise duplicated stock but add travel to every swap; spares held per site minimise travel but multiply stock and risk variants sitting where nobody needs them; a hybrid holds fast-moving variants at the centre and the rest per site. The choice is the buyer's and it should be written into the same routing table as the tree, because the two decisions are the same decision seen from two ends.

Three rules govern the pool in a multi-site programme. A promise made on a family name rather than a variant is the kind of promise that ends with a door out of service.

Second, the old unit is retained. At one site a retained unit is a courtesy; at estate scale it is the raw material of comparison. Where it goes — to the central bench, to the pool quarantine shelf, or back to the supplier under a return authorisation — decides whether the estate can look at it again. The return route itself should be written down: what is authorised, what is shipped, what comes back, and who carries the freight, which the contract clauses that make motor-not-driving support work set out as questions rather than answers.

Third, a swap proves the unit, not the cause. The door became operable after the unit was replaced is an observation. The motor did not move because the drive was damaged is a conclusion, and it can only be reached by examining the unit. At scale that difference is the difference between a repair programme and a mass replacement, and the record must be written so the two cannot be confused: observation and conclusion belong in separate fields.

Pooling also interacts with step seven in a way that has to be decided in advance. When a fingerprint matches, the sensible instruction is to hold replacements while the pattern is examined. That is a service decision that changes what a door looks like while it is in effect, so the estate decides whether to accept it and how to describe it in its own records, rather than discovering the policy when a held swap is reported as a delay.

Round Eight: Authority to Close, and Authority to Send Back

Multi-site operations add one thing that single-site work never had: authority spread across places. Someone may close a fault at the desk without travel. Someone may dispatch a body. Someone may swap a unit. Someone may authorise a return. Someone may sign the door off as operable. Someone may accept a root cause for the estate. Writing these six powers down separately, with a name and a title against each, is the difference between a scalable operating model and an accumulation of local improvisation.

The characteristic failure is normalisation. A caretaker at one site fixes a door by replacing a unit, tells nobody, and does it again next month. At another site a technician does the same and writes a slightly different note. After a year the estate has no fault records at all, because the real operating procedure was never written down — it was learned from whoever was nearest. The only defence is that every action leaves a record, and that the record says who acted and under which authority, so that a deviation is visible rather than invisible.

For the supplier side, the questions are written as requests for evidence rather than expectations of performance, because the supplier's own operating facts are theirs to state. What does the written support ask for before it authorises a return. What can be traced to a unit, and what cannot. Whether a unit can be examined before the site swaps it. Whether a like-for-like alternative exists for a given variant. Whether the supplier will look at a retained unit across an estate rather than one door at a time. CONFIRM-PER-SUPPLIER is the label to carry against each answer, and the agreement should be signed before the second site reports the same symptom rather than during it. The escalation path for motor-not-driving faults is the right place to build that ladder, and the training outline is where the three tiers learn the same eight steps in the same words.

One boundary has to be stated before the first fault rather than after the first argument. A unit that fails before it is put into normal service and a unit that fails in normal service are different populations, and the agreement must say where the line falls, because the site that swaps a unit during a fault call decides, by default, where the line falls for that unit. Without a stated boundary the estate's fault mix becomes a classification exercise rather than a measurement, and the two populations cannot be compared to each other.

Scoring the Four Models Against Your Own Constraints

The models are not a preference; they are a fit. The scoring below is deliberately blank because the inputs are yours: the estate's shape, its door population, the mix of models it has standardised on, and the people it can actually put in front of a door.

Placed against two axes — how much travel each model implies, and how much of the tree it can close before anyone leaves — the four models sit where you would expect, and the gaps between them are the estate's own shape rather than a ranking.

quadrantChart
    title Where the four operating models sit against travel burden and remote reach
    x-axis Low travel burden --> High travel burden
    y-axis Small remote share --> Large remote share
    quadrant-1 The desk carries the estate
    quadrant-2 The hybrid stretches the desk
    quadrant-3 The local hand carries the estate
    quadrant-4 The van carries the estate
    Site local hands: [0.25, 0.3]
    Regional travelling technician: [0.78, 0.45]
    Central triage desk: [0.3, 0.82]
    Desk floor and van hybrid: [0.5, 0.65]
ConstraintHow you measure itModel AModel BModel CModel D
Share of sites with a trained, verified person on siteCount sites against a named list of verified people
Spread of sites and the travel each route impliesDistance from each site to the nearest hub
Share of doors on models whose product record shows a networked platformCount doors, read the dated product page for each SKU
How often the estate sees the same model fail at more than one siteFrom your own fault records
Whether the agreement permits a fault to be closed without attendanceRead the operating agreement
Where pooled spare lock units of the right variant can reach fromMap the pool against the door list
Depth of credential mix in the doors that fail mostRead the fault records by symptom
Whether someone is authorised to authorise a return at each siteRead the authority ladder

Score each row from zero to three against the model, where zero means the model cannot cope with the constraint at all and three means it copes well. Then weight the rows: which constraints actually decide the estate's cost and its door availability, and which are merely there. A model that scores well on rows you do not care about is not the answer; a model that scores badly on the row you cannot compromise is also not the answer.

The scores will usually produce a hybrid, and that is not a failure of the exercise. It is the normal result of estates that have both a handful of large sites with their own technicians and a long tail of small sites with nobody on site. The scoring sheet earns its keep by making the two halves explicit: the desk's workload, which is a resourcing decision you own, and the van's route, which is a geography decision you own. What usually goes wrong is that the desk's workload is never sized, so the desk becomes a queue nobody owns.

Where Each Model Wins, and Where It Breaks

Model A wins when the estate is small, the doors are few, the model is standardised, and someone on site has been trained on it. It is also the right answer for a single building, because scale never arrives to save you from the discipline.

Model B wins when skills are scarce and geographic spread is manageable, and when the fault mix is dominated by physical checks rather than configuration. It breaks when the same model starts failing across sites, because the technician cannot see the pattern.

Model C wins when the estate is large, the models are networked enough for the desk to read something useful, and the fault mix contains a high share of credential and configuration problems. It breaks when nobody owns dispatch, or when the doors that fail are in buildings with no connectivity to the management system at all.

Model D wins in the messy middle, and it needs one thing to work that no model supplies by itself: a single record schema that the desk, the floor and the van all write into. It breaks through role ambiguity, when a fault sits between two bodies and each assumes the other has it.

Three illustrative scenarios show how the same fault tree lands differently. In the first, a chain of small sites each with a trusted caretaker and one standardised model, Model A works and the central function does nothing except hold the register. In the second, a widely spread estate where the same model reports the same symptom at three sites within a fortnight, the deciding factor is Model C's ability to compare fingerprints and hold the swaps; the vans travel less and the estate learns faster. In the third, a group with an in-house technical team and satellite properties, Model D is the only answer, and its first task is to stop the three bodies from writing three different records. These are scenarios, not cases; they carry no measured outcomes, because the outcomes belong to the estate that runs them.

Questions to Put to the Supplier Before the Portfolio Grows

What does your written support ask for before it authorises a return? Ask for the list in writing before the first fault. It should match the minimum field record your technicians are able to produce, and it should tell you what happens to a unit you send back.

Which fields do you maintain per model, and what happens when a field is not offered? The product record shows the answer in its blanks, and a blank is a statement that the model does not offer that capability. Ask for the dated product page for each SKU you intend to standardise on, and store it with the register.

Can a unit's batch or configuration be traced, so a fingerprint can be compared across sites? Ask what is traceable and what is not, and in what form it comes back. If the answer is that nothing is traceable, that is still an answer worth having, because it tells you the seventh check will run on symptoms rather than on units.

What support do we get if we hold replacements while a fingerprint is being examined? Ask for the route, the reference and the response the support team will give. A held swap is an operational decision, and its consequences should be written down before it is taken.

Who is authorised to swap a unit at our sites, and how do we tell your support which sites are ours? Ask for the identifying detail that travels with a return, and for the record you should keep against each door.

Which steps of the tree does your support expect our technician to run, and which does your support run from your side? The tree is a method, and a method shared across the counter is worth more than a method held on one side. This is the question the evidence to request before you buy is designed to make concrete.

The First Three Moves After a Second Site Reports the Same Symptom

When the same fault appears at a second site, the temptation is to treat it as two faults and to keep the estate running. Three moves change that.

First, hold the swap on the second door, and write the hold into the record with its reason, its date and the signature it is based on. A held swap with a reason is a decision; a held swap without one is a delay, and the two are treated very differently when the door's operability is reviewed.

Second, pull the fingerprint line from the first fault and compare the fields: model and variant, symptom wording, indicator behaviour, the power result, the override, the credential path, the batch where recorded, the environment class and the closer condition. If they line up, the third move is not a swap.

Third, decide which tier owns the next step and record that decision with its reference. The desk may be right that the fault is a configuration matter; the floor may be right that it is a unit. The estate does not need the argument settled on the doorstep; it needs the fault, the evidence and the decision to live in one place where the next site can read them.

That is the practical content of motor not driving multi site work. The tree is the same tree. What changes is the body that runs each check, the register that lets a desk compare doors, the schema that keeps three bodies writing one record, and the pooled spare lock units and the authority ladder that turn a swap into an auditable decision rather than a habit. Every one of those is written down before it is needed, and every one of them is worth less if the estate cannot say which model and which variant a given door carries. Start with the register, then the schema, then the routing table.

The next step is not a larger purchase but a routing table, a register and a record schema, agreed before the second site reports the same symptom. The fault tree itself is set out in Motor Not Driving: Decision Tree for Field Teams, the per-fault form is in Motor Not Driving: A Field Worksheet to Complete, the escalation authority is in When to Escalate Motor Not Driving, and to Whom, and the file that travels between sites is in Motor Not Driving Documentation Set. On the estate side, Smart Lock Multi-Site Management covers the wider operating picture, Fingerprint Smart Locks for Facility Managers covers the door population, and Office Smart Lock Site Survey covers the survey that produces the object schedule the record depends on. When the routing and the schema are written, send them with your model list to request a quote and ask for the dated product page for each SKU you intend to standardise on.

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